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DYNAMIC SEIGNIORAGE THEORY: AN EXPLORATION
ABS TRACT
This paper shows that the optimalextraction of seigniorage
implies a strong tendency for inflationto fall over time toward
its socially optimal level. Thepoint is made using a multi-period
model in which (i) thegovernment can finance deficits through
bond issue or money creation,(ii) private-sector expectationsare
rational, and (iii) the government sets theinflation rate each
period in a discretionary manner. Oneway to view the model i as
a synthesis of the "tax-smoothing"theory of government deficits,
which predicts that the inflationtax follows approximately a
martingale, and of models of discretionarypolicy making, which
predict (absent reputation effects) thatinflation is likely to
exceed its socially optimal level. Bothpredictions are modified
when the two approaches toexplaining inflation are merged.







money creation plays a
Economic research of the
effects of steady-state,
explaining inflation the discretionary-policy approach,the
second the tax-smoothing approach.
Calvo (1978a,b), Barro (1983), and others have observed that
when policy is made on a discretionary,period-by-period basis,
the lure of surprise price-level movementsmay, in equilibrium,
lead to higher inflation and lower revenue than wouldresult if
the goverrunent could bind itself to aprior choice of the
inflation rate. The incentive to violate such a commitmentin
later periods is an example of thegeneral problem of time
inconsistency: optimal government plans that affect private
choices may no longer appear optimal after the private sector has
made those choices.'
'See Kydland and Prescott(1977) and Calvo (l978a,b). Seigniorage
is not, of course, the only mechanismthrough which government
1
arise when the seigniorage derived from
prominent role in the public finances.
l950s and 1960s elucidated the allocative







issue debt so as
the inflation tax
government and the associated welfare loss of
recent work has aimed to explain observed
and has proceeded along two main lines. The first
on the temptation to effect the resource transfer
through surprise inflation. The second adds a
to the problem, exploring official incentives to
to spread over time the distortionary burden of
It is convenient to call the first approach toWhilethe discretionary-policy approachpredictsthat
inflation will be higher than is socially optimal (absent possible
reputation effects), the tax-smoothing approach implies that
inflation, whatever its level today, will be persistent. Barro
(1979) suggested that an intertemporally maximizinggovernment
with exogenous spending needs would find it optimal to formulate
contingency plans for taxes that equate over all future periods
the expected marginal loss due to tax distortions.This
"permanent-income" view of tax-setting behavior has been extended
to the inflation tax by Mankiw (1987), Grilli (1988a,b), and
others, who argue that, at least as an approximation, a country's
inflation rate should follow a martingale if seigniorage is the
main force driving inflation.
A look at some data gives cause for skepticism about both
views of inflation- -at least in the simple forms paraphrased
above. Chart 1 shows the time series of annual inflation rates in
the United Kingdom and the United States between 1871 and 1986.2
In both countries, inflation shows occasional sharp upward spikes
(for example, during the two world wars), but there is no clear
credibility problems may cause suboptimally high inflation
(although it has been a key mechanism at some time in many
countries). Some studies, for example, Kydland and Prescott (1977)
and Barro and Gordon (1983), focus instead on attempts to exploit
short-run tradeoffsbetweenunanticipated inflationand
employment.
2A number of au.thors have made thepoint that fairly long time
series might be needed to detect the mean-reverting behavior
tested for below. Given this need, it seems best to use data from
countries, like the U.K. and the U.S., which have maintained
stable political institutions over a long sample period. Vittorto
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Chart 1: U.K. and U.S. inflation, 1871—1986evidence of persistently high inflation. Indeed, when examined
over a long time period, inflation apparently has a tendency to
revert to a fairly low mean level.
These visual impressions are confirmed by the more formal
econometric tests reported in table 1. For both countries, the
favored univariate statistical modelforinflationisa
first-order autoregression with an autoregressive coefficent a
that is positive, but well below unity.[The Dickey-Fuller
criterion rejects decisively the hypothesis of a random walk (a
1.) in favor of a stationary alternative.] The implied steady-state
annual inflation rate for the U.K. is 3.5 percent; that for the
U.S. is 2.2 percent.3
Does a tendency for inflation to revert to a low level imply
that discretionary policy-making and tax smoothing should be
rejected as elements in a positive theory of inflation taxation?
In this paper, I argue, to the contrary, that both concepts are
central to understanding the dynamic behavior of seigniorage
revenue and inflation. Existing models stressing the potential
3Mankiw (198]) finds that 1952-85 U.s. data lend some support to a
version of the tax-smoothing theory of inflation. This finding may
be due to the relatively low power of a short sample period,
or it may reflect sub-sample instability, which Barsky (1987)
suggests is present in long time series of U.S. inflation. Using a
broader country (and time) sample, Grilli (1988b) and Poterba and
Rotemberg (1988) find evidence against the tax-smoothing theory's
general validity. The evidence in chart 1 suports Fischer's (1986,
p. 14) observation that "Going further back in history, it is
clear that inflationary bias is only a sometime thing. At the ends
of the Napoleonic and Civil Wars, and World War I, Britain and the
United States deflated to get back to fixed gold parities. These
episodes too deserve attention in the dynamic inconsistency
literature." Indeed, the generalized industrial-country
disinflation of the early 1980s provides a more recent example,
albeit less dramatic, of the type of event Fischer describes.
3Table 1







Inflation—0.0113+ O.4953.Inflatiori + Error
(0.0049) (0.0817)
h -0.04 d —2.00 R2 —0.24
Notes: Standard errors are given in parentheses; each regression
is based on 115 observations. h is Durbin's test statistic for
first-order serial correlation, which is distributed N(0,1) under
the null hypothesis of serially uncorrelated errors. d is the
Durbin-Watson statistic (which is biased toward 2.00 in the above
regressions). The AR(1) specification reported above was reached
in tests against alternatives involving up to ten lags of
inflation. Inflation data were constructed as
where P is the price level. For the U.K., the price level over
1870-1965 is the GNP deflator reported in table 111.12 of Forrest
Capie and Allan Webber, A Monetary History of the United Kingdom,
1870-1982, vol. 1 (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1985); over
1966-1986, it is the ratio of nominal to real GNP from the Annual
Abstract of Statistics, various issues. (See Grilli l988a for
details.) For the U.S., the price level over 1870-1975 is the
ratio of nominal to real income as reported in table 4.8 of Milton
Friedman and Anna J. Schwartz, Monetary Trends in the United
States and the United Kingdom (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1982); over 1976-86, it is the net national product
deflator from the Survey of Current Business. Price indexes are
based at 1929 100.role of time inconsistency in inflation taxation do not offer
predictions about the equilibrium dynamics of government debt and
of tax rates; in contrast, monetary tax-smoothing models do offer
an account of these dynamics, but one that fails as an equilibrium
theory because of its failure to confront and resolve the
time-inconsistency issue. By merging the two approaches below
using a time-consistent equilibrium construct, however, I derive a
theory consistent with the story told by chart 1. The theory
predicts that at each point in time at which inflation is
positive, it is higher than it would be if the government could
precornmit itself to future tax policies. But the theory also
predicts that, given rational private expectations, government
tax-smoothing behavior results in an inflation rate with a
tendency to fall over time toward the government's preferred
long-runinflationrate(zeroin mymodel).Reputation
effects play no role in this equilibrium.4
In technical terms, the investigation pursued here is an
application of dynamic game theory to interactions between the
4See Lucas (1986) for accessible accounts of both the tax-
smoothing idea and the obstacles to implementation implied by
dynamicinconsistency.Lucasdescribes examplesin which
government debt management policies can be used to ensure the time
consistency of optimal plans. Were such schemes generally
feasible, the naive tax-smoothing models might be resuscitated as
viable positive theories. Particularly in monetary economies,
however, it appears that the scope for such fine-tuning is very
limited. The nature of these limitations is discussed in section V
below. Poterba and Rotemberg (1988) consider the role of time
inconsistency in tax-smoothing inflation models, but they do not
focus on the dynamics of tax rates and government debt. Bohn
(1988) uses a framework similar to the one developed below to
study government motives for nominal debt issue in a stochastic
environment.
4public and private sectors. The endogenous State variable
responsible for the economy's dynamics is the stock of government
debt. In the time-consistent intertemporal (Nash) equilibrium
constructed below, the government's inflation policy reaction
function is optimal, given the private rule for forecasting
inflation; at the same time,
the government's objectives
(1968), in a model of
generations, presented an
equilibrium concept applied
The structure of the pa
model economy in which the
welfare criterion that is




the government's and shows why
the plan general contains the
central result equilibrium,
inflation has a iv provides a
closed-form linear example in which the earlier theoretical
results can be checked numerically. Section V examines some




More recent applications include (aside from those mentioned in
the last footnote) Kydland and Prescott (1977), Calvo (l978a,b),
Fischer (1980),Millerand Salmon (1985)
,Oudizand Sachs (1985)
Chari and Kehoe (1987), Cohen and Michel (1988), and Persson and
Svensson (1988).
private forecasts are rational, given
and constraints. Phelps and Pollak
capital accumulation by successive
early economic application of the
here.5




an in a Stackelberg game,
inconsistent. Section III
a time-consistent Nash







multiple equilibriums and (ii)
time-consistency problem through
5government open-market operations in real and nominal securities.
Concluding remarks are contained in section VI.
I. The Model
The analysis is developed in a setting due to Brock (1974). A
single representative private agent consumes a single perishable,
nonproduced consumption good. At the start of period t, the
representative agent maximizes
+ g + v(m)],
where c is private consumption; g is government consumption, which
enters linearly into private utility; m stands for real money
balances (nominal balances M divided by the price level P);
is the subjective discount factor; and v(m) is twice continuously
differentiable and strictly concave.
Conditions necessary for individual optimality are well
known. The linearity of utility in consumption fixes the
equilibrium real interest rate between periods s and s+l, at p
—(1




5By assuming a constant real interest rate, I am pushing to the
background questions of the term structure of government debt.
Implications of this modeling strategy are mentioned at various
points in section V.
6where superscript "e" denotes a private expectation,
e e a it (P
-P)/P s+l s+l Ss+l
and iis the nominal interest rate between dates s and s+l
S
defined as (1)e1/• The variable its+l will be referred to as
the inflation rate between periods s and s+l. On this definition,
its+l is positively correlated with, but differs from, the standard
measure of the inflation rate, (P -P)/P ;the former is,
s+l s s
however, the measure relevant to the present setup. Notice that it
approaches an upper bound of 1 as the conventionally-defined
inflation rate becomes arbitrarily high. Thus, it has a natural
intepretation as a tax rate, with it —1the confiscatory rate.7
The economy is endowed with a fixed "natural" output level y,
but the amount of output available to be consumed falls when the





whereic(O) —0,,c' (0) —0,,c"(ir) >0,and c' (it) has the same sign
as it. The inflation-cost function in (2) is meant to capture
7'rhe above conditions on privatemoney demand and the real
interest rate follow from the fact that the individual maximizes
subject to a sequence of finance constraints of the form w
(l+p )w
-c -(p+ir)m ,wherew is the sum(atthe end
s-is-iss-i s s-i s
ofperiods) of real money balances and the real present value of
allother forms of wealth. See Brock (1974), Obstfeld and Rogoff
(1983),or Persson, Persson, and Svensson (1987).
7costs distinct from the inflation-tax distortion of money demand,
for example, the reduction in production efficiency often said to
accompany higher inflation. Alternatively, c(ir) allows inflation
"surprises" to inflict social Costs distinct from those of
perfectly anticipated inflation.
The government must undertake a fixed level of consumption
each period, so g —g,a constant.8 In the model, however, only
two sources of public finance are available, the proceeds of money
creation and the proceeds of borrowing from the private sector.
The presence of nonmonetary taxes in the formal model would not
change any main predictions about inflation; but a model extended
along the lines of Phelps (1973) would have implications for tax
- 9 rates that might be useful in empirical evaluation.As this
extension is not pursued here, the revenues from money creation
and from public debt issue are now described in turn.
The seigniorage obtained from the public through money
creation over period s, a, is given by
M -M
5 s-l a —
S
S
Assuming money-market equilibrium leads to a useful formula for
6This assumption is easily relaxed, as shown at the end of section
III. The model as specified does not account for an endogenous
government spending level, however.
9Phelps argues that the inflation tax should covary positively
with other taxes. Poterba and Rotemberg (1988) and Crilli (1988b)
present empirical evidence on the covariation of inflation with
other forms of taxation. Their evidence is not entirely consistent
with Phelpss prescription.
8a. Let p(ir1) be the money demand function implied by (1).
[Since v"(m) < 0, '(i) <0.]Then seigniorage can be written
(3) — +(m5 -m51)
— + -
Thisequation states that seigniorage is derived from two sources,
(i) the public's desire to maintain real balances in the face of
inflation and (ii) any desired Increase in real balances.
The second means by which the government can finance budget
deficits (surpluses) is the sale (purchase) of price-level indexed
bonds that are not subject to default. Many of the dynamic results
derived below may continue to hold when government debt
obligations are denominated entirely in domestic currency, rather
than indexed. The introduction of nominal debt complicates the
technical analysis considerably, however, and also creates a clear
potential for multiple equilibriums. Consideration of these
difficulties is postponed until section V.
A bond has a fixed real face value (of unity) and pays
interest p after a period. The stock of such instruments held by
the government at the end of period s, a, evolves according to
(4)a —(1+ p)a1 + -g.
By integrating this expression forward, applying the long-run
solvency condition lim (l+p)a ￿ 0, and using (3), one obtains
the government's intertemporal budget constraint,
9(l÷p)a1+(l+p)5 t[lrm+ (m -m,fl (1+p)g/p.
Itis assumed that the government's budgetary obligations always
lead to nonnegative inflation rates.
The government maximizes an objective that is increasingin
private consumption (of private and public goods)and real balances,
(5) W _5t[u(+g)+z(m)]St{[-()) +z(m)}.
The period utility function u(c +g)+z(m)appearing in (5) is
concave and twice continuously differentiable. is general
enough (given a change in the inflation-cost function ,c(ir))to
admit government-specific socially preferred inflation rates. To
ensure (somewhat arbitrarily) that the inflation rate most
appealing to the government is zero, I assume that atthe
real-balance level rn associated with a zero inflation rate [that
is, where v' (rn) —p/(l+pfl,z' (rn) 0. Thus, my choice for does
not really allow the possibility that the government aims directly
to maximize the welfare of the representative agent.'° Noticethat
'°In the model with c(O) —0,equilibrium appears to be generically
nonexistent if the government's objective function is the same as
the representative agent's. One way to allow the two functions to
coincide is to assume that output is lost when inflation deviates,
not from zero, but from Friedman's full liquidity rate, -p. If it
is assumed in addition that full liquidity occurs at a finite
level of real balances m, with increments to real balances beyond
this point yielding zero utility, then the economy converges, not
to zero inflation as it does below, but to deflation at rate p,
with a steady-state government asset stock a1 satisfying pa1 -g—
10the formulation above assumes that the private sector and
government have the same discount rate, an assumption made in most
of the tax-smoothing literature. Consequences of relaxing this
assumption are discussed briefly at the end of section III.
II. Precommitment Equilibrium
If the government can precommit to follow chosen policies,
the resulting equilibrium is the outcome of a Stackelberg game in
which the government moves first, and moves only once. If this
game is played at t —1,say, the government announces its choice
of a policy path for the entire future, taking into account that
each private individual's best response under precommitment is to
believe the announcement. The equilibrium policy path is the one
that maximizes of (5) when it is correctly anticipated by the
public. This section examines the precommitment solution and
describes how it breaks down as an equilibrium concept when
policies are not pre-set,but are chosen instead on a
discretionary basis in the period of their implementation.
In the model with precommitment, a government moving on
date 1 picks an inflation path tss—l that maximizes W1 subject to
the public-sector intertemporal budget constraint, the private
optimality conditions
pm. (In this long-run equilibrium, government interest earnings
in excess of g are simply used to retire circulating money.) The
problem with this formulation is its lack of realism: the kinds of
inflation costs summarized in the function k(,r) are difficult to
ascribe empirically to deviations of inflation from -p.
11(6) in=p(751) (s￿ 1),
and given inherited levels of aggregate real balances, m, and
government assets, a0. Constraint (6) embodies the government's
rational belief that if all future policies are iriunutably set on
date 1, it will be in each private individual's interest to use
those known policy settings in forecasting inflation, and thus in
deciding how much money tohold.1'
Strictly speaking, the government does not choose the path of
prices. That path is instead the outcome of a market equilibration
process that the government controls indirectly throughthe amount
of money it issues. Given the announced inflation path, the
government must engineer a path for nominal money consistent with
market clearing on each date. The constraints on the government's
plan ensure that such a money-supply path exists and is unique;
and if speculative price-level bubbles are ruled out, that unique
money-supply path necessarily produces, in equilibrium,the
announced path of prices.12
To derive necessary first-order conditions (for an interior
maximum) from the standpoint of date 1, let ''—l be a sequence
of multipliers associated with the finance constraints (4), and
consider the Lagrangian
11Notice that the price level in the period prior to government
choice, P0, is an historical datum. Therefore, choice of the price
level's path from t —Ion is equivalent to choice of the
inflation rate from t —1on.
12A formal proof could be constructed along the lines of Calvo
(l978b, appendix 1). On mechanisms for ruling out price-level















ic(ir5)]as the utility from consumption when
the inflation rate is 7r; u' (ir) -u' [y
-K(r)J,c'(ir)
for￿0.Differentiation of L1 with respect to a (s ￿1)shows
that A isconstant at level [since (l+p) 1].
Differentiation with respect to it1 and (s >1)leads to
(7)-V
and, for s >1,
(8) -u' (it) -(l+p)z's' Altsi -
wheres+i is (minus) the elasticity of real money demand with
respect to the period-s opportunity cost of money,
13
will be called, somewhat inaccurately, the interest elasticity of
money demand.) The resulting optimal-control inflation path is
13Recall, from (1), the definition of i/(l+i) as (p+ir1)/(l-+-p)
(under perfect foresight). Equation (1) also implies that
-(p + ir1)/(l + p)mv"(m) —-(p+its4l)1As+l
which
is the relationship used to derive (8).





1. Equation (8) implies that inflation is constant at a level
* * * *
—it(say) for s >1.(it1 need not equal it ,though.)
Given that g is constant, government assets remain constant (at
a1) after date 1. The precomnhitmentsolution thus entails perfect
tax smoothing after the initial period. At inflation level it*, the
marginal value of the additional seigniorage from a perfectly
foreseen one-period rise in inflation equals the marginal Cost of
that rise. The additional revenue from raising inflation for a
period s, leaving other periods' inflation rates unchanged, is (in
terms of period-s goods) i(i + (it) +(l+p)jf(it) -' (it)=
- t(it)j;5this sum multiplied by is the marginal
141n what follows, it is assumed that the precommitment optimum
exists, is unique, and is characterized by (7) and (8). (Section
LV describes a linear problem, closely related to this one, in
which existence and uniqueness can be verified.) As (8) makes
clear, a necessary condition for the validity of these assumptions
is that rj not exceed unity everywhere. The important role of the
interest elasticity of money demand is discussed further in a
moment.
'5The term (l+p)' (it) -f(it) —p'(it) comes from the effect of
the increase in iton money-demand growth in periods s-i and s:
given it1 and money demand growth falls by s' (it) in period
s-I and rises by that amount in period s. The net effect on the
period-s value of government revenues is negative and proportional
to p. This "stock-shift' effect of a change in inflation on money
demand was emphasized by Auernheimer (1974) in his discussion of
the transition between inflationary steady states; its presence
explains why the interest elasticity of money demand, not the
expected-inflation elasticity, is relevant to the discussion here.
14benefit from the foreseen one-period rise in inflation. The
marginal cost of the foreseen increase in iris the sum of the
S
consumption loss, -u' (ir), and the period-s welfare value of the
reduction inrealbalancesheldduringperiod s-i,
-(l+p)z' [(ir5)].' (ir5).
2. At an interior optimum, the interest elasticity of money
demand, e, is always less than 1. To see this, imagine that the
government has formulated a plan in which, in some period s, t(,r)
￿I.The argument in the preceding paragraph shows that a foreseen
decrease in irleads to an increase in seigniorage over period s.
There is thus a feasible plan in which inflation is no higher on
all dates and lower on at least one. It follows that the original
plan could not have been optimal.
3. The precommitment solution would be time inconsistent if
the government were, in fact, unable to precomnhit to the plan
chosen on date 1. To see why, suppose the public believes the
date-i plan when it is announced, but that on date 2, the
authorities suddenly find themselves able to reoptimize. They can
thus choose a new optimal initial inflation level and the
inflation rate iroptimal for dates 3, 4, etc. Time consistency
** * ** *
requires that — — . Since(by assumption) ml *(1r),
** **
the date-2 analogues of (7) and (8) imply that it2 and itsatisfy







15Because>0(at positive inflation rates), and because the last
term on the right-hand side of (9) is nonnegative, (9) cannot hold
if the three inflation rates appearing in it are the same, as
required for time consistency. Thus, the optimal policy under
precommitment is time inconsistent: on date 2, the planner, if
free to do so, would
:h00se
an initial inflation rate ir'
different from the rate it previously planned on date 1.
The time-inconsistency problem is perhaps most striking when
u' (it) —0;this is the case studied by Calvo (1978b) ,inwhich
price-level "surpises" are not costly and inflation inflicts harm
exclusively through its role as a tax on real balances. Provided
>0,it is optimal to set it1 at its maximal value of 1 in this
case.16 This policy amounts, in effect, to an official declaration
on date 1 that the existing currency is valueless, an action that
allows the government sell a "new" currency to the public for use
in subsequent periods, Of course, when the next period arrives it
becomes optimal to have another currency "reform" if>0.'
Even when the government puts no weight on money-demand
distortions [z(m) —0],butinstead cares only about the
current-output costs of inflation, equation (9) shows that the
16 *
Since ALmS >0and, from the perspective of date 1, no social
costs depend on irk, it is optimal on that date to maximize current
inflation. Obviously, the solution for inflation is not interior
in this special case. If some it1 <1left the government with
enough interest income to cover its expenditure forever without
recourse to inflation, would be zero.
owe this interpretation to Cuillermo Calvo. (Notice that the
date-lpricelevel,measuredinthe new currency, is
indeterminate.)
16precommitment solution is time inconsistent. In planning the
future (constant) inflation rate 7r* on date 1, the government, as
shown above, balances marginal revenue--equal to Js(lr*)[l
-
(*)]againstmarginal cost each period.Once date 2 arrives,
however, the marginal revenue from raising it2 from the planned
value of is simply ,.L(lr*), while the marginal revenue from
* *
raising subsequent it's from itis still (ir )[l -c7r)].Marginal
costs don't vary as time passes in the present case. The optimum,
as seen from date 2, will thus call for an initial inflation rate
higher than that in later periods, in contrast to the flat
inflation rate from date 2 onward called for by the date-I plan.
In other words, on date 2 the government need no longer take
account of the effect its choice of it2 has on date-l money demand.
III. Time-Consistent Equilibrium
The timeinconsistency of theprecomlnitment solut ion
disqualifies it as an equilibrium of a dynamic economy in which
all agents continually reoptimize. Private agents who understand
the government's objectives and constraints will attempt to
forecast the government's actions on the basis of its budgetary
conditions, and perhaps other variables. The government, in turn,
will consider the effects of its policies on private forecasts;
but it is likely to view itself as influencing private forecasts
only through current and past policies, and not through the mere
announcement of future policies. In such a setting, equilibrium is
most naturally analyzed in terms of policy and forecasting rules
that relate actions to the variables defining the economy S
17current state. A time-consistent equilibriumis decribed by a
policy rule that maximizesthe government's objective function
each period, given that private agents forecast onthe basis of
the rule and that the government takes the private forecasting
rule to be beyond its control.
In this section, the foregoing notion of time-consistent
equilibrium is explored. The Nash gameconsidered here posits
decision rules for private individuals that are parametricfor the
policyTnaker and that depend, through the system'sstate variables,
on past and current policies, but not onannounced future
policies. These features of the setup ensuretime consistency.
In the present context, the state of the economy on anydate
t is assumed to be fully described by the predeterminedvariables
entering the government's budget constraint forthat date,
and ai. This assumption means that only policy and forecasting
rules without memory are considered. The state of the economy
could conceivably include (in addition to mi and ai) policy
actions taken in the past or even extrinsic variables, but this
study does not adopt so broad a view. In particular, possible
reputational equilibriums of the type Rogoff (1989) critically
reviews are ignored.'8
'8Barro and Gordon (1983) and Grossman and Van Huyck (1986) are
among the papers examining reputational equilibriums.The
reputational equilibrium idea is generalized by Chari andKehoe's
(1987) notion of a "sustainable plan," which allows players'
reaction functions to depend on state vectors that may explicitly
include past government actions along with the more conventional
state variables (for example, asset stocks) usuallyconsidered.
(Chari and Kehoe refer to these vectors as "histories.")The
equilibrium singled out below corresponds to theMarkov perfect
equilibrium studied, in a quite different setting, byMaskin and
18Given the foregoing exclusion of strategies with memory, it
is natural to assume that individuals base forecasts of
price-level change between any two periods s and s+l on aggregate
real balances m and on a ,thesame variables that determine the
S S
government's choice of s+l If each individual j calculates his
expected inflation by the rule 7r'÷l —e(m,a),and if the number






Underreasonable conditions (for example, that 3€/3m > 0), the
equation in tn above has a unique solution, m —m(a;),which is
illustrated in figure 1.19 Without loss of generality, therefore,
one can assume that any government views current and future
aggregate money demand as given by the 'reduced-form" relationship
* n
sothat —€(a)for all periods s in which government
Tirole(1988).Barro's(1983)essentially static analysis
implicitly uses the latter equilibrium concept, but hismodel




Onewould expect 8€/3m to be positive for two reasons. First, a
rise in last period's real balances raises the base for the
inflation tax,thereby raising the marginal revenuefrom
inflation. Second, a rise in last period's real balances, all else
the same, lowers the increase in real money demand over the
current period, thereby lowering government wealth and raising ).,






aggregate reaT money balances
I—
V
LOdecisions still have to be made. Only the case e' (a) <0is
relevant: higher public assets lead to lower expectedinflation.20
A government planning on date 1, say, maximizes the function
E' '1v(1r )+z(m)]subjectto m —[E(a)1(whichit takes
s1 S S S S
asa given constraint for s1) and the sequence (4) of finance
constraints. If is a sequence of multipliers associated












as discussed above, a0 and m0 are predetermined as of date1.
Differentiation with respect to (s >1),and a5 (s ￿1)
leads to the first-order conditions2'
(10)-u' (i=Am1
(for all s ￿1)






20The reasoning in the previous footnote suggests that3€/3a < 0.
Since8€/3m> 0has been assumed, it follows that €'(a)<0.
21For convenience, €(a) is assumed to be differentiable.
20which necessarily hold at an interioraximuxn. Of course, a





Necessary condition (10) equates the marginal outputcost of
inflation to the shadow valueof marginal revenue, which is
proportional to last period's real balances.The second, inter-
temporal condition, (11), equates the current marginalvalue of
public resources, A, to the payofffrom raising government saving
by a unit in period s and then returning governmentassets to
their initial path in period s+1.
The latter payoff can be viewed as the sumof three
components. The first sununand on the right-handside of (11) is
the direct marginal value product of an additional unit of saving,
that is, the discounted gross rate of return on saving, fl(l+p),
valued at next period'.s resource shadow price, A÷l. If this term
described fully the marginal return to government saving, then
since (l+p) —1,A would be constant over time, as in the
precomniitment solution. The two remaining sumniands onthe
right-hand side of (11), however, capture additional,indirect
effects of government saving on the government's objective
function. Both indirect effects are a consequence of the
assumption '(a)<0,which implies that higher government
wealth, by lowering expected inflation, increases money demand.
Consider first the expression
21z' (i.[e(a)] )/.L' (a)
1 —' [e(a)]€'(a)
in (11). This term reflects the effect of an additional unit of
government saving on the social utility derived from private
real-balance holdings. Notice that the total indirect effect of
additional government saving on government assets is not just
i' (a): that term measures only the first-round impact of
higher period-s government saving on real money-demand growth over
period s. There are further feedback effects that magnify this
first round effect by a "multiplier" 1 -' [e(a)Jf'(a). To make
the government's problem meaningful, the multipler process through
which successive increments to araise money-demand growth,
raising a further,is assumed to converge, not explode.
Convergence requires that
(13) 1 >i.i' [c(a)]€'(a).
The last term in (11),
+s+lEE(a5fle' (a)A+1
1 —' {€(a))e'(a)
reflects the fact that the additional period-s money-demand growth
induced by higher government saving in period s affects government
revenue in periods s and s+l. All else equal, higher money-demand
22growth in period $implieslower growth in period s+IL, but there
is a net positive effect, proportional to p, on the period-s
present value of revenues. In addition,the inflation-tax base for
period s+l is higher, with a revenue effect proportional to
While the additional terms in (11) measure complicated
effects, the basic message of the equation is simple: the marginal
physical return to government saving exceeds the simple gross
return on bonds, I +p.As a result the government will be
motivated to accumulate assets over time when 8l/(l+p). This is
the main economic factor driving the declining time path of
inflation described below. The rest of this section is devoted to
analyzing the model's dynamic equilibrium.
To start, consider the implications of conditions (l0)-(l2)
for the government's policy rule. Because m —[(a)]for s ￿1,
equations (l0)-(12) can be reduced to a (generally nonlinear)
difference equation system in the costate variable Aand
government assets a. Given m0 and a0, an initial costate value
determines it1[via(10) for s —1]and thus a1 [via (12) for s
1]; the subsequent paths of A and a are then determined by the
first-order conditions, with inflation rates coming from (10). An
optimal plan entails an initial choice A such that the resulting
path of the economy maximizes the government's objective function.
A
Let V(m 1,a l be the value function for the government's
problem at the start of period s, when the previous period's real
balances and government assets are m51 and a1 respectively. As
shown in the appendix ,thecostate A* can be interpreted as
23av(m1,a1)/3ai (thatis, isthe shadow value of
government wealth at the start of period s, and an extra unit of
government wealth at the end of period s-I implies, other things
equal, l/ extra units of wealth at the start of period s). In
*
particular,Xl —88V(m0,a0)/3a0.Equation (10) therefore implies
that inflation is chosen to satisfy the equation
-u' ()— [8V(m1,a1)/3a1]m1




Thereason for this rule's dependence on the private forecasting
mechanism denoted byisclear.22
A time-consistent equilibrium can now be defined. It is a
0 * * * functions+1 —y(m,a) such that -y(m,a;-v )— -y(m,a).
Kydland and Prescott (1977) explained how a time-consistent
equilibriuni can be viewed as the limit of a sequence of iterations
in which, at each step, private forecasting rules are updated to
reflect fully the policy rules that were optimal in the previous
iteration, given the private forecasting rule then being used. In
this equilibrium, it is optimal each period for the government to
22Recall that f(a) depends on athrough the equality
a[m(a ;a),a ] e(a),wherem(a ;a) is the solution to m
AS S S S S
i{a(m,a)](see figure 1).
24use the rule —-y(m,a),giventhat the private sector forms
its expectations using the same rule, 7r÷l —-y(m,a). No general
results concerning the existence or uniquenessof this type of
equilibrium seem to exist, except inthe linear case (see Cohen
and Michel). Section IV,below,contains a linear example that can
be viewed as an approximation to the presentmodel.23
Having defined a time-consistent equilibrium,the next step
is to characterize it. Suppose that the public bases itsforecasts
on the rule ;(ma) which, at the same time, describes
the government's best inflation response given this rule. As shown
earlier, the forecasting rule can be expressed, in equilibrium,in
the alternative form r1— .y*(a), wherey*(a) solves the
equation in s+l
— 1p(1r÷i),a]. Along the equilibrium
th, theactualinflation rate iris given by -y (m 1a1)
(1i (a1fl,a } —(ai).
Return now to the intertemporal necessary condition (11) Use
(10) to eliminate and A+i, substitute i(a5)
for the arbitrary
expectation rule €(a), and rearrange to obtain:
231f there are multiple time-consistent equilibriums, it is at
least conceivable (but far from obvious) that the government will
be a dominant player, in the sense that the public will follow it
if it announces a time-consistent plan. Such a dominant-player
role could allow the government to coordinate expectations on the
time-consistent equilibrium that leads to the highest value of its
objective function. Barro and Gordon (1983, p. 112) seem tohave
this idea in mind when they assume, in their setting, that the
government can choose the reputational inflation equilibriumit
prefers.
25* * * * *
-
u'[-y (a1)] u' [-y (a)] J(p+i(a)]j.' (y (a)]-y '(a)
*
- * 1+ * *
u[y(a1fl [-y (a)] I - (a))-)'(a)
(14) z'([(a )]}[7*(a )]'(a )
+ s*s
S
1-' [i(a) 1-i' (a)
To interpret this condition further, note that if expectations are
unresponsive to government assets(a)—0],the result is
the condition u' (r)/mi —u'(1r5÷1)/m5 appearing in Mankiw (1987)
and Grilli (1988a, 1988b): it is optimal for the government to
stabilize the ratio of the marginal output cost of inflation to
the inflation-tax base, which, with constant money demand, would
require a flat inflation path and an unchanging governmentasset
level. Since the government is taking money demand as givenin
this special case, inflation costs caused by reductions inthe
utility from money use [and represented by the function z(m)]do
not appear in the intertemporal smoothing condition.
When (a) <0,however, (14) shows that the ratio
and thus inflation itself, declines over time. As
observed earlier, additional government saving now yields a gross
physical return li-p plus the extra benefitsfrom the induced
increase in money demand [see (11)1. Since the government's
discount factor is just l/(l+p), the government willaccumulate
bonds, which it can do by always setting inflation higherthan the
level consistent with an unchanging stock of government assets.
26Let A(a5) denote the right-hand side of equation (14) and
B(a1) the left-handside. Then on the assumption that A(a) is
invertible, the difference equation
A(a) —B(a1)
describestheevolutionofgovernmentassetsalong a
time-consistent equilibrium path for s ￿ 2.
It is simple to find the stationary state of this system, .
If —g/p,the government can finance its consumption without
recourse to the inftion tax. It has also been assumed that at
the level of real balances i(O) corresponding to an inflation rate
*-
ofzero, z' [(O)] —0.Thus, -y (a) —0in any time-consistent
equilibrium. Equation (14) confirms that—g/pis the long-run
equilibrium stock of government, assets.
'S
Figure2 illustrated th dynamics of convergence (in the
relevant region where a < )underthe assumption that (a) < 0.
Equation (14) shows that for any asset level a <a,A(a) > B(a).
Since A(a) has been assumed invertible, there is a unique path
converging to budget balance along which government assets
rise- -and inflation falls- -monotonically. Notice that the path
described by figure 2 is showr as beginning with a1 rather than
with a0. The asset stock a1 depends on a0 (and m0), however,
through the government's finance constraint and its initial
inflation choice.
It was mentioned in section I that the above model is special
27-
A (a.
FIGURE 2: Convergenceto the long—run equilibriumfollows
a.
the difference equation A(a)B(a5_1)
01 2. •:*in assuming that the government and private sector share a common
discountrate.Under plausibleassumptions,however,the
government discount rate will exceed the private rate. For
example, policymakers may discount the future more heavily than
private agents because they face some probability of being removed
from office. In formal terms, a positive difference between the
government and private discount rates amounts to lowering in
(14) while holding p constant. Clearly, a —g/p,with 1 (a) 0,
remains a stationary state of the model; however, the A(a)
schedule in figure 2 may now cross the B(a1) schedule to
the left of the origin, a possibility that would give rise to
multiple stationary states, alternately stable and unstable.
Notice that the model does not imply that governments always
run surpluses. As in any model with some tax smoothing, the time
pattern of deficits depends on the time pattern of government
spending which, for simplicity, was assumed above to be flat. The
model is easily extended to account for an exogenously varying and
perfectly foreseen path of government spending. Just respecify the
equations in terms of a state variable equal to government assets
less the present discounted value of future government spending:
(15) a -(1)h+l
h—0
Rewriting the model in terms of the state variable (15)
leads to some predictions about the relation between expenditure
changes and deficits. Sufficiently large, sufficiently temporary
28innovations in public spending, for example, will induce the
governmentto engage in partial tax smoothing by raising inflation
and running a larger deficit. (Inflation will be more sensitive to
expenditure innovations than in a model with complete tax
smoothing, however.) Once spending has returned to normal,
however, inflation will not remain at a permanently higher level,
but will instead tend to come do.in over time.
The steady-state of the economy is now one in which the
deficit is zero on average: absent unexpected shocks, asset income
just covers the annuity value of the government expenditure path,
and there is no need ever to use the inflation tax.
IV. A Linear ExampLe
A closed-form linear example illustrates the characteristics
of the equilibrium described in the last section. For the purpose
of the example, I assume that z(m)0, so that inflation reduces
welfare only through its negative effect on current output.
The key trick in obtaining a linear example is to redefine the
model, not in terms of inflation, but in terms of the inflation
tax levied on money holders, r, where
r irm
Sss-l
Major assumptions are that the aggregate demand for real balances
is a linear decreasing function of the expected inflation tax,
29(16) m —8o
-
andchat the output cost of inflation is given bythe function
2 —(l/2)r.
The government is assumed to maximize
(17)
Formulation (16) is sensible if the interest elasticity of
money demand is low enough thatinflation-tax proceeeds and
inflation do move together. As an example, suppose that individual





(1-+ s+l (0 >1),
as it is when the private utility-of-moneyfunction is vOn) =
(l-O)1m19and the interest elasticity of money demand is less
than 1. Since r° — Irein ,thismoney demand function can be
s+l s+l s
1/9 -1/0
expressed as —m[(l-$)m5 +s+l1
Linearizing in a





which, when summed over all individuals, is of form (16).
30One assumption that will be needed to obtain a solution is that
(18) 61 <
this inequality certainly holds in the example just given [since p
—(l-)/]when 0 >1.Inequality (18) plays the same role here as
did the assumption <1in previous sections: it ensures that a
fall in inflation-tax revenue does not raise total seigniorage a.
The solution method is to solve first for the time-consistent
inflation policy along an equilibrium path, that is, a path on
which past as well as current expectations of future inflation
taxation coincide with the policy. Once a solution along
equilibrium paths is in hand, a general solution, valid for
arbitrary values of the economy's state variables, can be
inferred. Define the variable d as E (l+p)'g
-a[as 5 h-O h+s+l s
in (15)]; d can be thought of as the government's debt inclusive
of future expenditure commitments. The rule being sought has the
general form —;(m1,d1);but along an equilibrium path m1
—- 61;m5..1,d5..1,so the reduced-form policy rule makes ra
function of the beginning-of-period government debt alone, r —
with (d) >0on the way to the steady state.
It is natural to conjecture a linear reaction function for
the government,
(19) r —
31in equilibrium private expectations must obey
(20) r41 —yd.
These two equations lack intercept termsbecause the goverrutient
will always choose r— 0when d —0,that is, when asset
S s-i
income fully finances public spending needs.
To determine -y, one can use a necessarycondition for a
time-consistent optimal plan: if the public follows (20),and if
f.:19) is to be followed by the governmentin the future, (19) must
be optimal today. This requirement will be shown todetermine a
unique coefficient in (19) and (20), i —
Stepone is to find the value function V(d)for a
government that starts out withinherited debt d at the beginning
of period t÷l, given that (19) is followed for s > tand that
expectations are determined by (20) for st. [V(d) is therefore
the value function along an equilibrium path. Under (17),
V(d) —-(1/2)$Stl(d 1)2.
s—t+1





2Analternative procedure, which leads to the sante solution, is to
calculate directly the government's optimal policy when ittakes




















Noticethat the private sector's forecasting rule (20) has been
used, along with (19), in calculating V(d). Itwill be verified
at the end of the exercise that -'6 <Iand that 0 << 1,so
that the debt process is directly convergent along the equilibrium
path. [An inequality corresponding to 7*61 <1,inequality (13),
was assumed in the precedingsection.]25
At the start of period t,thegovernment's problem is tc
25 *
Here,-y 81 is the marginal effectof higher government assets
on real money demand. The derivative &'[E(a5)]E'(a5)
in
(13)also measures this effect.







Atthis point that the assumption of a continuing equilibrium path
is used again, since the above expression for d is based on
substituting so -y6idi
for the time-t state variable in1. By
(21), the first-order condition for an optimum is
f((1+ p) -151]d1 _________ +
2 2
—2°'
(1 - )( (1- (1-)'6) J
whichcan be solved to obtain
2




Equation(23) has the same form as the assumed rule (19);
time consistency requires that the parameter -y in (19) equal the
coefficient of di in (23), that is, that it satisfy the
quadratic equation
(24)()— 61(1-p61)2
-(1+ p) + p(l + p) —0.
34[Equation (24) is derived by using (22) to eliminate in (23).





Both roots are positive and real,26 but it is the smaller of the
two that is the optimal policy coefficient To rule out the
larger root, consider the graph of equation (24),which can be





Clearly, (p) >0,'(p) <0(see the last footnote), and '(y) <
o forall< p. At y —16, however,(-y) is negative: (l/6l)
-
p51)<0.Figure 3 therefore describes how the roots
of (24) are determined. The fact that the larger root necessarily
exceeds 1/61 means that it can be ruled out as a meaningful
solution. Clearly, the smaller root of (24),-y, is below 1/61.
Because is above p in the time-consistent equilibrium, it
is optimal for the authorities to accumulate assetswhen d >0by
extracting seigniorage at a rate greaterthantherate




reaches its maximum at p61 —1/2,so the
inequality is always satisfied for positive p.





(1 ÷2)1+ P(l + p)that would hold d constant, pd. It is straightforward to check
that when -y —-yin (22), 0 << 1.Debt evolves according to d
—d1
along the equilibrium path, so for the relevant value of
',thedebt variable converges monotonically to zero. The
government thus reduces its (average) deficit to zero over time,
as indicated by figure2.27 The inflation tax also converges to
zero according to the equation r —Tsl
*
Asnoted earlier, -ydescribes optimal policy, and optimal
private expectations, along the economy's equilibrium path. In
general, however, the economy could begin out of equilibrium, with
the 2revious period's real balances m1 not given by 6
61-yd1.Itcan be verified that in this case the optimal policy
rultfor the government is
* * *
— -y(m1,a1) — m1 + y (l+p)d
--y
*-l
Anumericalexample illustrates the properties of the
tinie-consistent solution. For the purpose of this example, is
taken to be 0.96 (corresponding to a real interest rate, p, of
0.0417 per period) and is taken to be 12 (corresponding to a
miney-demand interest elasticity of 1/2 when the utilityof real
2Equation (22) shows that (0,1) when <(l+p)/(l+61) andp < .Thesecond inequality has already been established; the first
turns out (after tedious algebra) to be equivalent to p&1(2
-
p&1)
< 1.The function p&1(2 -PS1)
reaches a maximum of 1 when —
1,however, and the model assumes that p61 <1.
36money balances is isoelastic)It is assumed further that the
economy starts out on the equilibrium path ondate I (that is,
with —*d)
With the above parametrization, 7* —0.0695and i4' [given by
(22)] —0.8319.In thetime-consistentequilibrium, government
debt therefore follows the difference equation d —0.8319d1;
by the linearity of the example, inflation-tax revenuefollows this
same difference equation, starting from the level 0.0695 d0.
V. Nominal Government Debt
The model has assumed until now that all public debt takes
the form of promises to deliver specified amounts of real output
on future dates. In many countries, however, much (or most) public
debt is denominated in local currency, not output. This section
briefly sketches some ways in which the presence of home-currency
government debt could change conclusions reached above.
There are two main differences compared with the previous
analysis. First, nominal debt may lead to multiple equilibriums
through a channel absent above,the effect of inflation
expectations on nominal interest rates.28 If all public debt is
nominal, however, there still appears to be a time-consistent
equilibrium in which inflation falls over time.
The second main difference, which I regard as a theoretical
curiosity because of its knife-edge nature, arises when the
government can issue indexed and nominal debt side by side. Once
28Calvo (l988a) analyzes a two-period model in which such
multiplicities can occur.
37the menu of financial instruments is expanded in this way, the
goverrunent may be able to attain the precommitment allocation,
evenunderdiscretion, throughsophisticatedopen-market
operations in real and nominal bonds.
'1ultiple equilibriums. Suppose first that the government can
buy and issue nominal debt only. A nominal bond issued in period s
is a promise to pay l+i currency units in period s+l, where is is
the period-s nominal interest rate. If a denotes the real value
of net nominal government claims on the public at the end of
period s, the government's finance constraint takes theform
(25) a —(1-ir)[(l+i51)a1
-m1]+m -g
a constant g.[It is clear from (25) that the real inflation-
tax ase in period s now includes nominal public debt obligations,
equaL to -(1-1-i 1)a1, along with lagged real balancesj Given a
nominal interest rate 1s-l that is predetermined from the
perspective of date s, a government that is a netdebtor in
nominal terms (a1 <0)has an additional incentive to engineer
surprise inflation in period s (an unexpectedlylow value of
1-it). Of course, it will be true in equilibrium that
(26) 1 +p—(1
-ir)(l+is_I)
(the Fisher equation), where isthe rational forecast of the
government's preferred inflation rate.
38To adapt the earlier discussion to the case of nominal debt,
along an equilibrium path. Use of Fisher equation (26) shows that




notice the implication of (25) that the sole state variable
relevant to government decisions in period s+l is the real stock
of nominal government assets (net of monetary liabilities) at the
start of period s+l, (l+i )a' -m .Individualswill therefore S S S
forecast it according to some rule 1e—[(l+i)a -m]; and
s+l s+l s s s
by analogy with the tack taken before, it is natural to seek a
reduced-form rule ir÷l —€(a)governing expectations formation
If the government is indebted to the public (atm <0),
equation (27) may have multiple solutions, an outcome that could
A
lead to multiple equilibriums. Figure 4 (which assumes that €'<
0)illustrates this possibility. Notice that the slope of
,a) is ambiguous when a < 0 because a rise in it°both
s+l s s s+l
raises next period's public debt-service obligations, raising the
incentive to inflate, and lowers real balances, lowering the
incentive to inflate. In the case shown, c(lr÷1,a) has two
intersections with the 450 line; but more generally, it could have
more than two intersections or none.29
291 have pushed aside issues of term structure in assuming that all
nominal debt matures after one period. Calvo (1988b) has showit
that even under a constant real interest rate, as here, the
government may have incentives to issue longer-term obligations








as a function of real
it may be impossible
expectationsuniquelyOnly at the low-inflation intersection in figure 4 is it the
casethat higher government assets a (which shiftthe
c-function downward) lower equilibrium inflation expectations; at
the high-inflation intersection, public asset accumulation appears
to worsen the inflation outlook. Given a favorable outcome in
figure 4, however, the government has the additional motives for
asset accumulation that drive the results of the last two
sections. If a time-consistent equilibrium exists in this case,
one would therefore expect the earlier analysis to go through much
as before, despite the currency denomination of the public debt.
Equilibrium dynamics in an economy where the unfavorable
forecasting rule is adopted remain mysterious. It seems doubtful
to me that a time-consistent equilibrium(in whichthe
intertemporal government budget constraint is met) can exist in a
setting where increasing public deficits are accompanied by
falling inflation.
30
Attaining the precoimnitment path. When the government can
deal in both nominal and real securities, it gains the ability to
obligations could affect the number of equilibriums. For example,
given a nominal public debt in the form of consols, the analogue
of equation (29) has a unique solution because 3c/37r÷i< 0
everywhere. (Higher inflation expectations would lower the real
present value of future public debt-service obligations if debt
took the form of nominal consols.) In Calvo's (l988b) model, the
presence of real as well as nominal government debt, as in the
next case considered below, removes the motivation for a richer
nominal term structure, given the fixed real interest rate.
300f course, there could be a third, higher-inflation intersection
in figure 4, at which the c-function crossed the 45° line from
above. There, just as at the low-inflation intersection, higher
government assets would lower equilibrium expected inflation.
40rearrange its bond portfolio so as to influence the incentives it.
will face in future periods. Open-market switches between real and
nominal debt, at a given price level, alter the inflation-tax base
faced in the following period, and may allow the government to
sustain the precommitment solution as an equilibrium.
If the government's price-level indexed bond holdings are a





As in section II, first-order conditions for the precommitment
soI,tion are
(29,-u'(1r1)— A1[-(l+i0)a+m0],
and, for s > I, equation (8), which is repeated below:
-+Z sfh' Ai1s) -
(Thegovernment takes (26) into account for s >1when it
maximizes on date 1, since it cannot surprise the public in future
periods under precommitment.)
Suppose that on date 1 the government rearranges its asset
portfolio so that a satisfies
41** n* * * * * 1[-(i)a1+ m}— (l+p)z'[p(ir )]' (ir )+ X1[1
-(ir )]
that when the government reoptimizes
* inflationrate remains ir; and by main
at a forever, the government can
precommitment plan remains optimal in al
Intuitively, the government buys
date1to eliminate the incentive
precommitment level on dates 2, 3, etc.
retains some net home-currency liabi









conditions. Appropriate debt management
values associated
(8) and (29) imply
on date 2, its preferred
taming its nominal assets
ensure that the date-l
1 future periods.
enough nominal asse on
to inflate beyond the
Notice that the government
lity under the foregoing
-(1+i*)a>0.
key (1983) suggested a
governmentdebt that
discretion.Persson,
where starred values are the (time-invariant)
with the government's date-l optimization. Then
* *
plan:since ir>0,(29) shows that m
In a nonxnonetary setting, Lucas and Sto
method of managing the term structure of
sustains a precommitment optimum under
that the natural extension of
idea to a monetary economy involves an exact
government's net nominal bond holdings against
ilities, that is, a zero net position in home
Persson, Persson, and Svensson assumed away any
inflation surprises, a zero net position in home
necessary, in their framework, to ensure time
as Calvo and Obstfeld (1988) have shown, that
also sufficient only under quite unrealistic
avoids time inconsistency
42above because the real interest rate is fixed (so that the term-
structure issues raised by Lucas and Stokey don't arise), because
all nominal debt matures after a single period, and because
unanticipated as well as anticipated inflation is socially costly.
Real interest rates vary in practice and governments do deal
in long-term instruments; so the above scheme cannot be taken
literally as describing official behavior in actualeconomies.31 The
example nonetheless highlights incentives that may infuence
governments to some degree. Unfortunately, the problem of modeling
equilibrium with both real and nominal securities appears to be
quite difficult once a setting of any generality is assumed.
Success in this area would yield, not only positive predictions
about government deficits and inflation, but insight into the mix
of real and nominal government debt issue actually observed.
It is worth noting that the paper's central conclusions about
the dynamics of time-consistent equilibriums would probably
survive the introduction of a variable real interest rate. With
a flexible marginal utility of consumption, a declininginflation
path would imply rising output and a falling real interest rate.
A tendency for the real interest rate to fall would, in turn,
reinforce the tendency for public-sector deficits and inflation to
decline over time. Such an extension of the present model could
help explain the "stylized" fact that real interest rates are high
at the beginning of hyperinflation stabilization programs.
3LThis is probably fortunate, since few (if any) governments have
positive net holdings of domestic-currency bonds.
43VI. Conclusion
This paper has explored the dynamic behavior of seigniorage
in a time-consistent equilibrium with government borrowing and
lending. A major positive implication of the paper is that in the
absence of unforeseen shocks, governments will shrink their budget
deficits over time so as to reduce the need for inflationary
finance (or, for that matter, for other distorting taxes).
Before matching theory to data, stochastic disturbances (to
government spending requirements, say) would have to be worked
into the model. At least as an approximation, such a model should
replicate the stationary behavior of inflation evident in chart 1
of section I. The underlying cause of this behavior- -that in a
time-consistent equilibrium,there are incentives for debt
reduction beyond the physical return on assets--should still
operate in a stochastic setting.
Although the model yields predictions consistent with the
long-term behavior of U.K. and U.S. prices, it is less clear that
it captures well the apparently chronic inflation in many
developing countries, where seigniorageis typically more
important than in the industrialized world. The model helps
explain, however, why governments in budgetary crisis often
sharply devalue their currencies in the foreign exchange market,
thereby spurring domestic inflation but (hopefully) promoting
increases in official foreign reserves.32 A partial rationale for
devaluing at the outset of stabilization is to lower future
32See Kiguel and Liviatan (1988), who discuss some recent episodes.
44inflation by objectively improving the budgetary situacim i
shiftingexpectations--just as i the account given above.
Muchgovernment-causedinflation isnotlinked
seigniorage, official preferences change over time, and inflatio:.
is subject to serially correlated shocks beyond goverrunen:
control. So at best, the theory set out above explains one of th
underlying tendencies driving inflation, not all of inflatt:'r
Empl.oyment and distribution goals, two factors absent fromthe
paper's model, appear particularly important.33 Nonetheless,the
paper seems useful as a first attempt at explainingone
factor- -thekey one in some countries- -driving the dynamics of
inflation under discretionary policy formulation.
33The results of table 1 show long-run inflation rates for the U.K.
and U.S. that are positive rather than zero. This result is
inconsistent with a literal interpretation of the paper's model,
but could be explained by a government target inflation rate that
(for some reason) exceeds zero, or by policy considerations
independent of the public finances that influenceinflation
choices.Appendix. Interpreting the Government's Value Function
This appendix derives the link between the costate variable
associated with a solution to the maximization problem of
section III and the partial derivatives of the value function
V(m1,a1) for the problem.
After substituting [(a5)] for m in government finance
constraint (12), one can write that equation in the form
(Al) a—
[Inequality(13) is still assumed.] With the aid of this notation,
the value function can be defined as
(A2) V(m1,ai) —max +
+
Thepartial derivatives of (m1,a1,1r) are easily
computed. For example, the partial derivative is
—m1/(l
-'[€(a)]E'(a))>0.
Thus, the first-order condition for a maximum can be written




In view of (Al) and the constraint m —p(E(afl,(A3) gives the
optimalchoice of irs as a function i(m of initial asset
stocks.






(A3) and (A4) together imply
(A5) -u' (ir)—[8V(m1,a51)/8a511m51.
[Recall that—17(1+p)].Compare (A3) and (A5) with equations
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